As it turned out, the bursting of the tech bubble did not have those effects directly, but only a few years later the housing bubble in the US and the related subprime crisis did cause a painful recession from December 2007 through to the middle of 2009. Despite unprecedented remedial action in the US, the recovery has been long, slow and painful...and is ongoing.
Of course, just like the efficient markets hypothesis, the Minsky theory is just that...a theory. In reality, markets are complex beasts and are not free markets in the conventional sense. Markets are distorted by all manner of factors and interventions as we saw during the last property downturn in Australia.
Sydney housing market
We got the downturn, sure enough - although it was temporarily arrested by regulatory interventions, including "emergency low" interest rates, first home buyer grants and a relaxation of ownership rules for temporary residents - and as the global financial crisis unfolded, the number of unit approvals fell to desperately low levels in Sydney, as denoted by Point A on the chart.
Brown knew exactly what a dramatically shrinking debt market could mean for the British economy, specifically recession, and perhaps even a depression if the deflation in borrowing could not be stemmed.
More than half a decade later some markets continue to struggle, although nationally prices have eventually returned to all-time highs in Q1, 2014.
Similarly, the US saw many of its property markets plunge very significantly from their peaks.
On the other hand London prices have continued to break new highs. Construction dried up during the financial crisis and the London market became phenomenally tight and remains so to this day.
Of course, risk is also related to time horizon. Keen highlighted in Debunking Economics how stock market crashes are effectively inevitable given the irrational nature of markets and the level of speculation undertaken by many market participants.
Does that mean you shouldn't invest in shares? Not necessarily. Clearly, the Buffetts of the world have demonstrated that by viewing investment as the buying a share of a business - focusing on the quality of the underlying asset and the income streams derived therefrom, rather than the prevailing share price - the long-term outcome can be very favourable.
Similarly, for property markets in the housing markets risk is related to time horizon.
In his British book The Default Line, Faisal Islam describes how "there is a moment in the inevitable descent into bust when boom-time exuberance suddenly flips and becomes an inescapable iceberg".
A powerful mental image, and if that is the way in which you visualise housing markets then you would surely only ever rent and never buy. Others have long recognised market cycles and resolved to accept that while tides inevitably flow both in and out, over the long term inflation and wages growth push nominal prices higher.
Although it is doubtless scant consolation for those who bought at the peak of the UK boom and subsequently lost their employment, a prolonged and desperately sustained effort by the British Government and the Bank of England which has included half a decade of ZIRP, some £375 billion of quantitative easing and repeated housing market interventions (schemes including Funding for Lending and Help to Buy) has seen the economy return to a decent level of growth in 2014.
And UK house prices are back to record highs in 2014 too. Indeed, prices are increasing at such a frantic pace and so far ahead of income growth that many are questioning whether any lessons have been learned from the financial crisis at all. In supply-constrained London prices have simply kept on going up.